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1 Introduction
This paper is part of a larger research project on the evolution of the Perfect Competition concept
in a historical perspective. We try to follow the changes this concept has gone through from the
different alternative views during the so–called “Marginal Revolution” towards the consolidation
of the price–taker hypothesis.
Some recent theoretical developments have underlined the importance of giving up the hy-
pothesis of price taking agents.1 These developments plead for a different conception of the theo-
retical functioning of the market. This implies to model a perfectly competitive market based on
strategic behaviour rather than using the traditional Walrasian conception of agents. These works
intend avoiding the common trend in economic theory where imperfect competition is increas-
ingly taking the place of perfect competition as the general framework because of, as has been
∗ This work was supported by the Belgian French–speaking Community (Grant ARC 03/08–302) and the Belgian Fed-
eral Government (Grant PAI P5/10) through a Post–Doctoral Fellowship given to A. Alvarez and by the Universidad
Nacional de Colombia (Convocatoria de Investigacio´n 2006). A. Alvarez thanks all the participants of the “Atelier sur
l’interface entre la the´orie et l’histoire de la pense´e e´conomique” organized at the Universite´ Catholique de Louvain. In
particular, A. Alvarez is thankful to Michel De Vroey for his constant encouragement during his visit to Louvain–la–Neuve
and Clair Pignol for her enlightening comments on an earlier version of this paper. Contact: Andre´s Alvarez, Facultad de
Ciencias Econo´micas, Carrera 30 No. 45–03, Edificio 311, Oficina 305B, Ciudad Universitaria, Bogota´, Colombia. Telephone
number: (57 1) 3165000, ext. 12422, Fax: (57 1) 3165000, ext. 12316. E–mail: caalvarezga@unal.edu.co.
1 See Makowski & Ostroy (2001) and Gale (2000) for two essential references on the recent literature about the reestab-
lishment of the perfect competition framework within a strategic behaviour approach as an alternative view regarding the
traditional price–taker hypothesis.
stated by Arrow (1959), if we accept the price–taker hypothesis as the equivalent of perfect com-
petition we have no other alternative than to introduce the Walrasian auctioneer. This ’pessimistic
view’ on perfect competition pushes Arrow to postulate that in order to give a more realistic inter-
pretation of economic reality (without the fiction of the centralizing auctioneer) we need to build
imperfect competition models. The only difference with the basic Walrasian competitive model
being the abandonment of the hypothesis of price–taker agents.
The Economics of Imperfect Competition has reached an important stage of development in
terms of complexity without losing its capacity to raise and answer an important number of issues.
This has been mainly built upon the abandonment of the so–called “walrasian perfect competition
framework”. One of the main arguments advanced since the 1970s against the walrasian frame-
work is the absence of an explicit treatment of decentralized exchange and money. Both issues
are evidently linked. The failures of the walrasian theory of money are often identified with the
presence of a centralized exchange process which would be linked with a centralized price mecha-
nism and the auctioneer. However, it seems generally accepted that the well known Debreu–Scarf
theorem (Debreu & Scarf 1963) on the convergence of the core to the set of walrasian equilibria is
the final proof of the strong relation between Edgeworth’s and Walras’s views on perfect competi-
tion. Following this interpretation, Edgeworth’s theory of recontracting is a suitable way to make
explicit what is only implicit within the walrasian framework: the very conditions under which
a perfect competitive allocation emerges endogenously from agents’ descentralized interactions.
Edgerwoth’s approach, still following this interpretation, would show the process of negotiation
between agents leading to a solution which in the walrasian approach is left to the auctioneer
fiction. This is a story of two players and two winners. From the walrasian point of view, the
competitive price vector is seen as more than a spurious representation of an efficient allocation. It
is the limit case of economic competition and it appears to be a very robust situation. While from
an edgeworthian view, the Debreu–Scarf result has been seen as the demonstration of his genius
conjecture, and a rigorous generalisation of Edgeworth’s ideas. See Makowski & Ostroy (2001)
and Gale (2000) for two essential references on the recent literature about the reestablishment of
the perfect competition framework within a strategic behaviour approach as an alternative view
regarding the traditional price–taker hypothesis.
Our paper evaluates the traditional interpretation of the Walras–Edgeworth convergence on
perfect competition. Following modern literature on the Debreu–Scarf theorem, we show that
this convergence can be questioned from two main points of view. First, a main challenge for
the walrasian approach is revealed by the theoretical framework within which the notion of core
and recontracting has been built by Debreu and Scarf. The Walrasian General Equilibrium model is
based on hypothesis about individual behaviour and institutional structure of markets that avoid a
lot of questions which are unavoidable once the edgeworthian recontracting process is considered.
General Equilibrium theory, being incapable of solving questions on stability, presents this
convergence as an important result which can, at least partially, push this threat away. The Walr-
sian framework can be modified in order to incorporate an important solution concept from game
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theory, inspired from Edgeworth: the core. The convergence between Edgeworth and Walras is
thus usually presented as the definitive proof of an ancient conjecture: perfect competition can be
obtained as the limit situation of an economy with a great number of agents. Building upon the
Debreu–Scarf theorem, economists also assert that efficient and economic competition converges,
apparently giving an answer to those who conceived Game Theory and the Edgeworthian heritage
as an alternative to Walras:
Consider “competition”: the common sense meaning is one of struggle with others of fight, of
attempting to get ahead or at least to hold one’s place. It suffices to consult any dictionary of
any language to find that it describes rivalry, fight, struggle, etc. Why this word should be used
in economic theory in a way that contradicts ordinary language is difficult to see. No reasonable
case can be made for this absurd usage which may confuse and must repel any intelligent novice.
In current equilibrium theory there is nothing of this true kind of competition: there are only
individuals firms or consumers, facing given prices fixed conditions, each firm or consumer for
convince insignificantly small and having no influence whatsoever upon the existing conditions
of the market (rather mysteriously formed by taˆtonnement) and therefore solely concerned with
maximizing sure utility or profit... (Morgenstern 1972, p.1164)
As is clear from this quotation, the echo of Edgeworth’s criticism to Walras was related to schol-
ars’ inconformity concerning the walrasian price taker–hypothesis. The importance of this dissent
has been ignored within the development of the cooperative game approach. On the other hand,
historians of economic thought are well aware of the confrontation between these two important
figures of the late XIXth century economics. However, this confrontation has been interpreted as
a methodological misunderstanding.2 Most scholars credit this misunderstanding to a difference
in their conceptions of the dynamic process leading towards an equilibrium position. Making use
of the authors’ public and private opinions 3 (as in their correspondence), this debate has been
well studied. The common point of view of historians of economics points mainly4 to the idea of
the possibility of an effective out of equilibrium exchange during the process of convergence to a
general equilibrium situation. As Walker (1973) puts it abridging Edgeworth’s position:5
... that is why Edgeworth rejected the taˆtonnement approach his alternative was an advance
over the Walrasian conception, an early step in a new direction towards a line of investiga-
tion that is still being slowly worked out –a dynamic non–taˆtonnement theory of exchange,
production and consumption. (Walker 1973, p.147)
2 See Walker (n.d.), Rebeyrol (1999, p.78–100), Berta (2001) and Bridel & Huck (2002).
3 Edgeworth (2003 [1889]a), (2003 [1889]b) y (2003 [1891]) and Walras (1992 [1888]) and (1965). It is also important to
include the intervention of Bortkiewicz (1890) on “behalf”of Walras.
4 With the important exception of Bridel & Huck (2002) that we follow very closely concerning the interpretation of this
debate, though we go further in the analytical interpretation of the implications for modern economics.
5 This idea is mainly developed in Negishi’s interpretation of Edgeworth (Negishi 1985 and 1987). For an interesting
analysis of this idea see Pignol (2000). We study different modern interpretations of Edgeworth’s recontracting theory in
another paper.
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From this interpretation of Edgeworth’s analysis of the recontracting process it follows that the
main difference between his and Walras’s theory of perfect competition can only be observed if we
take into account the out of equilibrium process. This interpretation finally joins the modern idea
of convergence between both authors represented by the Debreu–Scarf theorem, as it is clearly
recognized by Rebeyrol (1999):
Les e´conomistes contemporains assimilent la concurrence parfaite a` un comportement de “pren-
neurs de prix” de la part des agents. Cette conception est associe´e a` l’ide´e qu’en concurrence, les
agents sont tre`s nombreux et donc atomise´s, sans pouvoir sur le rapport d’e´change global qui
pre´vaudra au marche´. Elle est plus ou moins renforce´e par la reconnaissance du the´ore`me limite
d’Edgeworth. (Rebeyrol 1999, p.99)
This paper tries to reconstruct Walras’s and Edgeworth’s conception of perfect competition
to evaluate the well–founded of this convergence on the properties of the final situation (perfect
competitive allocations) inspired by the Debreu–Scarf theorem. We will show that it is useful to
reconstruct a historical debate using modern economic analysis. This allows not only shedding
new light into the historians’ debate but it also contributes to open new questions for modern
economic theory.
In what follows, we first expose the main theoretical assumptions that Walras has to introduce
in order to ensure the price–taker hypothesis (section 2). We show that, contrary to what modern
economics does, it is not enough to assume price–taker agents without discussing the institutional
framework within which this hypothesis can be sustainable. We show that Walras’s entire insti-
tutional framework converges to a particular conception of individuals: non–strategic agents. In
this sense, the Walrasian analysis is hard to be translated into a modern strategic game theoretical
framework. This allows us to explain why the cooperative–game theoretical approach is more
suitable to develop into a Walrasian tradition. It is exactly in this direction that the Debreu–Scarf
theorem and the Core as an equilibrium solution tried to establish a convergence between Edge-
worth and Walras. Next (section 3), we discuss this interpretation of Edgeworth as the forerunner
of the cooperative–game tradition. We conclude that the main elements of the Debreu–Scarf the-
orem are extracted from a particular example given by Edgeworth that obscures the general idea
this author wanted to convey. Following recent works on the analysis of the Core as an equilib-
rium solution Vind (1995) it is possible to recover the originality of Edgeworth’s analysis and the
interest to go further in a alternative way to the cooperative–game framework. We finally present
some concluding remarks on the consequences of this analysis for modern “imperfect competition
economics”.
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2 Walras’s Theory: Perfect Competition and the Neutrality of
Pure Economics
As stated by Jaffe´ (1980, p.530), Walras’s pure economics is an integral part of a larger system of
social philosophy. Walras tried to build a pure theory of economics as a neutral system with respect
to the criteria of distributional justice. His pure theory of market, prices and money must satisfy
commutative justice in order to describe production and exchange as free individual decisions
isolated from distributional considerations. Agents must be free to exchange and produce within
the limits of feasible allocations that respect individuals’ budget constraints. These requirements
lead Walras to impose a regime of free competition as the main (and sole) framework of his pure
theory of economics.
Since the first versions of his pure theory of prices, Walras intends to distinguish perfect com-
petition from monetary exchange. In the following well known quotation from his 1873 lectures at
the Acade´mie de sciences morales et politiques de Paris, Walras presents money as a pure practical
economic device, excluded from the pure theory of competition:
Nous allons e´tudier le phe´nome`ne des prix se produisant dans ces conditions de concurrence
suppose´es rigoureuses, en faisant abstraction des petites circonstances perturbatrices comme
en physique, en me´canique, on fait abstraction tout d’abord, sauf a` les introduire ensuite dans
les formules, de la re´sistance des milieux, du frottement, etc. Seulement, nous e´carterons aussi
l’intervention de la monnaie. Pour avoir une ide´e exacte du me´canisme de la concurrence, il nous
a bien fallu l’emprunter a` l’un de ces marche´s ou` se font des ventes et des achats de marchandises
contre or et argent ; mais il est clair que l’intervention de la monnaie, qui est une simplification
pratique, est une complication the´orique qui doit eˆtre e´carte´e. Walras (1992 [1874], p.33)
The price taker behaviour and the “no–exchange–out–of–equilibrium” hypothesis are the main
characteristics of Walras’s perfect competition framework. This construction is founded on two
elements: the nume´raire and the fiction of a taˆtonnement process. The former allows avoiding the
treatment of strategic behaviours within a general equilibrium system and establishes a dichotomy
between the exchange process and price formation. The latter prevents pure theory of prices from
dealing with distributional effects of out–of–equilibrium exchanges.
2.1 The Nume´raire and the Market Organisation
In the Ele´ments d’e´conomie politique pure (henceforth EEPP6) Walras presents the foundations of
his theory of prices and competition in a two commodities pure–exchange framework (Section II,
4th edition). Money is absent from this analysis (it shall remain absent until section VI in the 4th
edition). Within this framework the two commodities are directly exchanged in a common market
and consequently there exists a unique rate of exchange (relative price). Even in the simplest case
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of exchange, Walras introduces the hypothesis of price–taking. In order to fulfil the commutative
justice requirements, agents exchange only at the equilibrium price of the market. As has been well
noticed by Rebeyrol (1999, p.100): “... l’absence de transaction en de´se´quilibre n’est une hypothe`se exor-
bitante que si l’on admet l’absence de conscience du de´se´quilibre.“ This hypothesis is the reduced form
of the hypothesis of common knowledge of all exchange opportunities. Even if Walras does not
explicitly describe the details of the organisation of this two–commodities–market, the reference
to the stock–market structure leads to conclude that this is not a disorganised bilateral exchange
process.
The generalisation of the price theory to the n–commodities case strengthens the requirements
of a well organised market process. In section III of his EEPP 4th edition Walras attempts to
demonstrate a “true theorem of general equilibrium”. A simple extension of the two–commodities
framework leads to a system of one independent market for every couple of commodities (i.e.
n(n − 1)/2 markets for n commodities). However, if nothing is said about the agents’ level of
information, this can result in an “incoherent” system of prices. A price system is incoherent if
different exchange strategies lead to different final allocations for an agent. In other words, if
some arbitrage gains of indirect exchange are still possible. The condition of a general equilibrium
system of prices is resumed by Walras (1992 [1888]) in EEPP:
L’e´quilibre parfait ou ge´ne´ral du marche´ n’a lieu que si le prix de deux marchandises quel-
conques l’une en l’autre est e´gal au rapport des prix de l’une et l’autre en une troisie`me quel-
conque. (Walras 1992 [1888], p.161–163)
This condition is, yet again, a requirement of neutrality of the perfect competition solution. If
there are un–exploited possibilities of arbitrage some agents loose exactly what other agents win
by exchanging at those prices. The value of an individual’s budget constraint is not independent
of the order s/he follows in order to obtain her/his desired final allocation. And a generalised
direct barter exchange within a system of isolated two–commodities markets may not necessar-
ily result in a perfect general equilibrium situation (Walras 1992 [1888], p.163). However, if those
possibilities of gains are common knowledge, the arbitrage strategies may be neutralised. Wal-
ras’s solution to this problem is the introduction of a common unit of measure of individuals’
budget constraints, namely the common nume´raire. If prices are all quoted in terms of a common
nume´raire, agents can verify the coherence of the actual price system. Due to the common knowl-
edge hypothesis on prices, arbitrages are neutralised. In consequence Walras concludes that “...
si on a crie´ des prix en nume´raire, la condition d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral a e´te´ remplie ipso facto” (Walras 1992
[1888], p.200).
Thus, the nume´raire is more than a hypothesis aiming at simplifying the computation of a price
system. The existence of a common measure of prices is accompanied of a particular conception of
the organisation of markets. The nume´raire is the necessary language for the common knowledge
hypothesis. The consequence of these hypotheses is a market system where strategic behaviours
are absent 7 (because they have already been neutralised!).
7 Costa (1988 and 2002) also analyses the problems Walras faces trying to avoid the arbitrage questions. He concludes
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2.2 The Taˆtonnement Process and Price–taking Behaviour
As Bridel (1997) and Bridel & Huck (2002) has clearly stated, the evolution throughout the dif-
ferent chapters and editions of the EEPP of Walras’s theory of price formation explained by a
taˆtonnement process has important consequences on his monetary theory. Because of Walras’s
attachment to the internal coherence of his pure economics, the theory of stability and dynamics
is subordinated to the notion of neutrality of the exchange process. This implies that the process
of price formation in perfect competition is finally presented as an instantaneous adjustment of all
markets towards equilibrium.
The well–known discussion of the walrassian taˆtonnement appears in the first editions of the
EEPP as a description of an adjustment process that actually takes place in the market. Here,
Walras underlines the role that competition plays in this process. The literary description of the
process, which will prevail until the last edition of the EEPP, sustains that during the formation
of equilibrium prices agents have an active role and that competition is the result of individual
decisions:
La valeur d’e´change laisse´e a` elle–meˆme se produit naturellement sur le marche´ sous l’empire
de la concurrence. Comme acheteurs, les e´changeurs demandent a` l’enche`re, comme vendeurs,
ils offrent au rabais, et leur concours ame`ne ainsi une certaine valeur d’e´change des marchan-
dises tantoˆt ascendante, tantoˆt descendante et tantoˆt stationnaire. Selon que cette concurrence
fonctionne plus ou moins bien, la valeur d’e´change se produit d’une manie`re plus ou moins
rigoureuse. (Walras 1992 [1888], p.70)
One question arises after reading this passage: What does a more or less rigorous competition
mean? Walras answers in the same paragraph:
Les marche´s les mieux organise´s sous le rapport de la concurrence sont ceux ou` les ventes et
achats se font a` la crie´e, par l’interme´diaire d’agents tels qu’agents de change, courtiers de
commerce, crieurs, qui les centralisent, de telle sorte qu’aucun e´change n’ait lieu sans que les
conditions en soient annonce´es et connues et sans que les vendeurs puissent aller au rabais et
les acheteurs a` l’enche`re. (Walras 1992 [1888], p.70)
That is, if the process of price formation is to take place under perfect competition, without
interfering with distributive justice, agents cannot exchange at prices different from those of equi-
librium. In order to guarantee this result, market intermediaries centralise supplies and demands
thus avoiding exchanges out of equilibrium. These intermediaries are stock brokers. Therefore,
in spite of the initial assertion according to which agents are active during the price formation
process, Walras ends up reducing perfect competition to a situation where agents are price–takers
because the active part of the market is left to crieurs and courtiers. However, these agents ap-
that the analytical difficulties associated with those problems lead Walras to avoid an explicit treatment of competition and
exchange. Following Rebeyrol (1999), we rather argue that it was not a matter of difficulty but a more profound attachment
to a particular conception of pure economics.
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pear only as intermediaries during the price formation process but nothing is said about their role
within the actual exchange process.
This description of taˆtonnement, which seems to appeal to an empirical argument in the text
presented above, is clearer in Walras’s lecture before the Acade´mie de sciences morales et poli-
tiques de Paris read in 1873 (Walras 1993). Here Walras explains that to avoid any possible ambi-
guity and to guarantee coherence with the aim of his pure theory8 he assumes taˆtonnement takes
place through the use of an automatic calculator (a computer) which determines the quantities of-
fered and demanded by each individual and can finally calculate general equilibrium prices (Wal-
ras 1993). Walras thus avoids the problem of the consequences of disequilibrium on expectations
(if the process takes place under an auctioneer) or on distributive effects (if exchanges take place
in disequilibrium). As most of Walras’s scholars since Jaffe´’s works (1976, 1977 and 1980) have
remarked, the taˆtonnement is a process during which no exchanges take place and can be inter-
preted (see Bridel 1997, chapter 4; 2002) as a method to solve a system of simultaneous equations
whose roots are the equilibrium prices.
Finally, an important reason that completes and reinforces the requirements of commutative
justice and explains why Walras focuses on the equilibrium situation is that it is optimal (i.e. Pareto
optimal). If exchanges were to take place at disequilibrium prices there would be unsatisfied ex-
change possibilities that could induce an agent aware of this situation to propose a different price
that would improve his condition and would not worsen that of the person willing to exchange
with him. The normative9 properties of general equilibrium are then imposed from the founda-
tion of this theory as the main element economics would never give up. This is why the existence
and welfare theorems can be dealt with independently from the dynamics. These theorems allow
establishing a theoretical reference with regard to Walras’s idea of commutative justice. There-
fore, without demonstrating the stability of equilibrium Walras may assert, just as contemporary
applied economics does, in his Studies of applied political economy [1898] that:
Les e´le´ments du syste`me e´conomique sont des services qui, sous le re´gime de la libre concurrence,
tendent naturellement a` se combiner en produits de la nature et de la quantite´ propres a` donner
la plus grande satisfaction possible des besoins dans les limites de cette double condition que
chaque service comme chaque produit n’ait qu’un seul prix sur le marche´ et que le prix de vente
de chaque produit soit e´gal a` son prix de revient en services. (Walras 1992 [1988], p.77 our
emphasis)
8After the first edition of EEPP (1874), and probably as a consequence of Bertrand’s and Edgeworth’s criticisms, Walras
makes more explicit his hypothesis of absence of exchange out of equilibrium. In spite of this textual evidence Walker
(1990a and 1990b) considers, contrary to most interpretation, that it is wrong to assume that this hypothesis means Walras
does not study the disequilibrium exchanges. Be this as it may, it is certain that as long as Walras’s monetary theory is
concerned, disequilibrium exchanges are absent. In lesson 29 of the EEPP 4th edition, “circulation”(exchange process)
begins after equilibrium prices are quoted.
9It is important to underline that here we are referring to the modern concept of “Pareto optimality”which has nothing
to say in terms of distributive justice or even of first best results. Then we accept the critical point made by Jaffe´ (1977)
against Hicks and Baumol concerning Walras’s extremely optimistic view of a free market issue in terms of a social welfare
criterion in terms of first best allocation or distributive justice.
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Walras considers that this situation should be the general frame for a pure economic theory.
If there is to be a pure theory of money, it must be adapted to the frame of competitive general
equilibrium. Besides from being static with passive agents as regards prices and only focusing
on equilibrium situations, this framework leaves no place for a theory of the organisation of the
exchange process without taking into account the perturbations of the equilibrium so induced.
However, Walras attempted, through the different editions of his EEPP and other writings (in
particular Walras (1992 [1988])), to introduce a monetary theory aiming at demonstrating the neu-
trality of the monetary exchange vis–a`–vis the equilibrium real prices.
This reasoning may be easily understood from what is nowadays known as recontracting
in a model a` la Edgeworth. The famous debate between Walras and Edgeworth regarding the
taˆtonnement process leads to the conclusion that, although Walras does not accept the terms
of Edgeworth’s argument, he accepts that at least for the pure theory of prices the criteria of
commutative justice and distributive neutrality imply that “Il est parfaitement juste de proposer
imme´diatement le prix unique” (Walras 1896: 184). We shall show in the following section how
many theoretical differences between both authors are present behind this apparent methodolog-
ical misunderstanding.10
3 Edgeworth’s theory of perfect competitive field: the limit case
of a decentralized exchange economy
3.1 Edgeworth’s “final settlement” and his equilibrium solution:
Following the developments of General Equilibrium Theory during the 1970´s it seems generally
accepted that the concept of the “core”as an equilibrium solution is the mathematical representa-
tion of Edgeworth’s “final settlement”. As summarized by Hildenbrand:
Since an economy with a finite number of agents is not perfectly competitive, Edgeworth
introduced a new concept of equilibrium; the ’final settlement’ or in today’s language, the
core. The ’Limit Theorem’ express that under ’perfect competition’ these two concepts coin-
cide (Hildenbrand 1993).
In the present section we shall show how this, now common, interpretation of Edgeworth’s
theory is not only misleading but it also contributes to erroneously reinforce the idea of the con-
vergence of the price–taking hypothesis and the recontracting analysis. It is necessary to revisit
Edgeworth’s texts11 in order to show that the source of this confusion belongs to him using an
10 For an in–depth discussion of this point see Rebeyrol (1999, p.90–100) and Bridel & Huck (2002). For an opposite point
of view see Walker (n.d.).
11All references to and quotations from Edgeworth’s texts are taken from the recent edition of his EconomicWorks by
Newman (ed.) (2003). This contains also the translation of some articles originally published by Edgeworth in French.
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example of, in modern terminology, a ’replica economy’. This was a simple illustration of Edge-
worth’s mechanism of recontracting. The convergence of an economy with a great number of
agents to a perfect competitive situation has been developed in the XXth century economics as the
general Edgeworthian framework. It is precisely within this framework that the idea of a Walras–
Edgeworth convergence and the consequent disregarding of their difference and the founding of
the price–taker hypothesis as the sole requirement for perfect competition takes its roots.
There are two main consequence derived from the traditional interpretation of Edgeworth as
exposed in the above quotation from Hildenbrand. Both of them point out to the direction of the
interpretation of Edgeworth as a theorist of the cooperative–games line and the forerunner of the
notion of the core as a solution concept. We will discuss these notions from Edgeworth’s texts.
This allows us to plead in favour of Edgeworth’s originality and of the need to rescue his theory
of perfect competition.
3.2 Blocking Coalitions and Combinations
The first consequence of this now traditional interpretation of Edgeworth is that the notion of “fi-
nal settlement” is necessarily linked to the formation of blocking–coalitions as it has been developed
within the cooperative game theory. Put in a nutshell, the core is the set of contracts that cannot be
improved, from the point of view of an individual, by an alternative arrangement with a different
group of agents. This notion thus leads to a representation of Edgeworth’s recontracting process
as a permanent formation and dissolution of coalitions. In this way, the set of actions available
to individuals are replaced by the actions of a coalition. Furthermore, the very notion of coop-
erative games implies that the coalition may be interpreted as a collective decision body. Within
this collective body individual strategies are subject to the distributional rule imposed within the
coalition. However, this interpretation does not really follow from Edgeworth’s texts as we shall
now show.
Two textual elements allow us to assert that the language of the cooperative game theory, and
the subsequent modern theory of the core, do not correspond to Edgeworth’s theory. (i) The mod-
ern notion of coalition seems to be an interpretation of Edgeworth’s concept of combination and
of cooperative associations. However, these two notions are deeply different when one exam-
ines them more carefully. Edgeworth clearly establishes a difference between a group of agents
entering in a series of bilateral contract relations and a combination. The logic of the former is
purely individual in the sense of an individual improvement accepting bilateral contracts within a
new group rather than the bilateral contracts the individual has formerly agreed to within another
group. In fact, within the new improving–group all contracts continue to be bilaterally established
and, more important, these kinds of association do not necessary imply giving up all previous
exchanges outside this group.
The particular case, which is typically presented as the Edgeworthian archetype of the recon-
tracting process (see Hildenbrand (1993)), where agents systematically renounce to their ancient
   Pá
gin
a 13 
Documento FCE No EE‐ 6 
 
contracts in order to recontract within a new group is only an example presented by Edgeworth.
It is the very well known example of a replica economy where a great number of only two types
of agents are gradually introduced in the market. Edgeworth intended to formulate a general
concept, with multiple types of agents and unequal number of agents (Edgeworth 2003 [1881],
p.43).
It is in fact, when Edgeworth actually discusses the extension of his theorem of the perfect com-
petitive field that he presents the notion of a combination as a source of imperfect competition:
“Combinations tend to introduce or increase indeterminateness; and the final settlements thereby
added are more favourable to combiners than the previously existing ones ”(Edgeworth 2003
[1881], p.44).
Furthermore, Edgeworth goes on to present a cooperative association as a particular form of
combination as a source of imperfection. This type of collective arrangement is exactly what the
cooperative game theory introduces as a coalition. Let’s follow Edgeworth’s text to clearly appre-
ciate it:
The fourth imperfection would seem likely to operate in the case of cooperative associations up
to the time when the competitive field shall contain a practically infinite number of such bodies;
that is, perhaps for a long time. To fix the ideas, suppose associations of capitalist–workmen,
consisting each of 100 members, 50 contributing chiefly capital, and 50 chiefly labour. Let
the field of competition consist of 1000 individuals. The point here indicated is that, notwith-
standing the numerical size of the field, contract will not be more determinate than if the field
consisted of 10 individuals. (Edgeworth 2003 [1881], p.49)
From this, Edgeworth extracts a completely different conclusion than that implied by the coali-
tional formation presented in the cooperative game theoretical framework. The core of an econ-
omy, in this framework, is simply reduced by the presence of an increasing number of agents
forming this kind of coalitions. From the Edgeworthian point of view, the number of agents does
not per se guarantee increasing competition when this kind of cooperative arrangement is the rule.
3.3 The example of a replica–economy and the price–taker hypothesis
One last reason that confirms the distance between the cooperative game notion of coalition and
the Edgeworthian pairwise arrangement within a subset of agents is that the former implies the
presence of a unique–price rule within the coalition and the latter does not. In fact, when Edge-
worth presents his example of a replica economy, gradually introducing the same number to both
sides of a two–type of agents’ economy, he clearly states that contracts continue to be bilateral
and the implicit exchange–rates could be different. Actually, the settlements (contracts) prevailing
within a group of, let’s say two agents of type A and three agents of type B, are not the same.
Exchange rates may be bilaterally defined and they could be different. However, when we con-
sider a group composed by agents with the same characteristics and we suppose perfect fluidity
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of information it is impossible to establish this difference. However, the important question aris-
ing from this example is not whether the bilateral contracts among any A and any B could differ
from another similar contract, but whether those contracts can be stable in the presence of imper-
fect information.12 The real interest of the Edgeworthian framework is the possibility to discuss
the presence of imperfections and not only to confine to a rule imposing a unique price within a
coalition or for the whole economy.
In fact, Edgeworth compares this example, where a same price prevailes among all bilateral
contracts within a subset of agents, with the result obtained by Jevons and Walras. This compari-
son is important because it allows Edgeworth to show the particularity of his example of a replica
economy, compared with his broader notion of recontracting:
The dealing of an individual in an open market, in which there prevails what may be called the
law of price, the relation between the individual’s requirements and that quantity collectively–
demanded–at–a–price, usually designated by the term Demand, between little d and big D in
M. Walras’s terminology, is elegantly exhibited by that author.
(...) Here it is attempted to proceed without postulating the phenomenon of uniformity of price
by the longer route of contract–curve. When we suppose plurality of natures as well of persons,
we have to suppose a plurality of contract–curves. (Edgeworth 2003 [1881], p.40)
Edgeworth constantly criticized the use Jevons and Walras make of the unique–price hypoth-
esis. In fact, as we have forewarned in our introduction, the main point of contention between
Edgeworth and Walras refers to the presence of this hypothesis. As Bridel & Huck (2002) have
clearly stated:
Well beyond the static or dynamic nature of the taˆtonnement, the opposition between the re-
contracting principle and the notion of supply–and–demand at given prices, between ’fields of
competition’ and ’competitive markets’ is at the heart of the controversy between Edgeworth
and Walras. (Bridel & Huck 2002, p.531)
As is clear from the last quotation, the echo of Edgeworth’s criticism to Walras was related to
an inconformity by recent theoreticians with respect to the walrasian price–taker–hypothesis.13
The richness of Edgeworth’s theoretical goal has been obscured in modern theory as a conse-
quence of the enthusiasm generated by the Debreu–Scarf theorem and the reconciliation of those
great fathers of modern economic analysis. Contrary to the hope of this line of reasoning, if there
exists a convergence in terms of the result (namely the final allocations) of the perfect competi-
tive situation between Edgeworth and Walras, there is no possible reconciliation in terms of the
exchange mechanism that allow to establish those results. To put it shortly: Edgeworth’s theory
12 “It is not necessary to resolve analytically the composite mechanism of a competitive field. It will suffice to proceed synthetically,
observing in a simple typical case the effect of continually introducing into the field additional competitors.” Edgeworth (2003 [1881],
p.34).
13 We refer here to the authors mentioned in the introduction of this paper: Gale, Makowski & Ostroy, etc...
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of recontracting cannot give content to the elusive notion of taˆtonnement as an actual economic
process. We think it is much more interesting for modern economic theory to take seriously the
confrontation well stated by Edgeworth himself:
Equilibrium is attained when the existing contracts can neither be varied without recontract
with the consent of the existing parties, nor by recontract within the field of competition. The
advantage of this general method is that it is applicable to the particular cases of imperfect
competition: where the conceptions of demand and supply at a price are no longer appropriate.
(Edgeworth 2003 [1881], p.31)
In this sense, the interpretation given by Negishi on the convergence of the perfect competitive
situation in both authors gives more credit to Edgeworth’s claims but needs to be reinterpreted.
Negishi, as well as Walker (1973), relies on the non–taˆtonnement theory as the good interpretation
of Edgeworth’s message. However, he accepts that the convergence of the final outcome of both
authors justifies the price–taker hypothesis:
The assumptions made in Cournot–Walras approach may not be realistic, unless is an auc-
tioneer, as in the case of well–organized markets. Edgeworth’s equivalent theorem justifies
Walrasian assumption, however, since it is not the assumption the outcome that matters for a
theory, and we can assume that the traders behave they were price takers, even though traders
are not actually price takers, provided we have the same outcome as assured by Edgeworth.
(Negishi 1989, p.338)
We think, contrary to this view that the price–taker hypothesis has to be taken for what it is: an
assumption. This implies not only a different conception of agent’s behaviour, as we have shown
in our interpretation of Walras’s theory, but also a different institutional framework in order to
neutralize all possible sources of strategic behavior. In other words, it is not possible to assume
Walras’s price–taker hypothesis as a consequence of a situation where there exists a huge number
of individuals neutralizing all possible strategic (i.e. arbitrage) actions each other might take. The
main result of our analysis of Walras’s Pure Economics is that the auctioneer, the nume´raire and the
presence of brokers are institutions giving content to the price–taker hypothesis. The result of the
taˆtonnement (namely the general equilibrium price vector) and the non–trade–out–of–equilibrium
notion are assured by this institutional framework.
In Edgeworth’s theory, the institutional framework and individual behavior are completely
different. However, the interpretation given in terms of the cooperative–game approach leaves
no place for a different view. This framework contributes to reduce the individual behavior to a
non–strategic one, as can be clearly seen from the opposition between the two main approaches
on game theory. As Gabszewicz (1999) recognizes it:
... when a small number of sellers are conscious of the interactive strategic context created by
their simultaneous selection of product supply, this selection can be viewed as a non–cooperative
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equilibrium when sellers do not coordinate their choices, and as cooperative equilibrium when
sellers enter into collusion to select their aggregate supply and share the production of it among
themselves. (Gabszewicz 1999, p.26)
We come now to the second implication of the modern interpretation of Edgeworth as a fore-
runner of the cooperative–game theory. This has to do with the conception of the theory of the
Core, and thus Edgeworth’s theory of final settlement, as a theoretical representation of the market
with the simplest or even no institutional framework.
3.4 The Core as a free–of–institutions framework and Edgeworth’s equilib-
rium exchange
The evolution of the cooperative–game theoretical approach leads economists, around the 1980´s,
to believe that the Core as an equilibrium solution was very attractive because of its simplified
Walrasian–like framework. The simplicity came from the fact that, as in the Walrasian–General–
Equilibrium approach, the Core is a solution concept built with few data: tastes, technologies and
endowments, without any institutional structure. As Mas-Colell (1982) states:
For the Cournot type analysis, one needs a specification of transaction institutions. This may
be a cumbersome and non–trivial task. In contrast, the Core determines final allocations from
the basic economic data: tastes, technologies, endowments. This is the feature of the Core which
makes it so attractive, but the level of abstraction at which it moves has an unfortunate conse-
quence. It is this: in the absence of an institutionally explicit model, the only sensible feasibility
constraint for a blocking coalition is that the proposed reallocation affect can be attainable for
all commodities simultaneously considered. This, of course, means that competition works by
the setting of entirely separated subeconomies! (Mas-Colell 1982, p.16)
As it arises from this quotation, the main characteristic of the Core approach, and thus of Edge-
worth’s, is that the economy seems to be completely described by those simple data. This is exactly
the same conception of a Walrasian Economy as presented in the Arrow–Debreu model. This re-
veals how the Debreu–Scarf tradition constructs the Edgeworth–Walras convergence upon a com-
mon view on what is a complete description of an economy. Both representations are misleading.
To interpret Walras’s pure economics as a free–of–institutions framework is equal to ignoring that
an auctioneer, the nume´raire, non–out–of–equilibrium–exchange, etc... are all institutional hy-
pothesis that are needed if one wants to ensure the price–taker hypothesis and thus the perfect
competitive economy.
This misleading interpretation of Walras’s and Edgeworth’s theories prevailing in modern eco-
nomic theory gives place to the mistreatment of the informational context and the exchange tech-
nology. It is a common place to say that a Walrasian economy explicitly assumes perfect informa-
tion and a non–frictional exchange technology. Both ideas are far from being accurate. De Vroey
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(2003) has remarkably well shown that Walras’s theory presumes less informational requirements
than Marshallian, and we can say now, than Edgeworthian frameworks. The reason for this is sim-
ple, and has to do with the price formation and technology of exchange those authors assume. As
we have shown above for Walras, the presence of the auctioneer implies that agents only need the
price–vector information in order to make decisions. Furthermore, agents do not make conjectures
on others’ decisions, agents have no strategic behavior.
When strategic behavior is introduced and there is no centralized price–formation system (i.e.
no auctioneer), and this is the case for Edgeworth, the informational flow becomes an important
issue. Furthermore, the fluidity of information is the main issue in order to assure a perfect com-
petitive field in terms of Edgeworth (1881 as in Newman (ed) 2003): There is free communication
throughout a normal competitive field. You may suppose the constituent individuals collected at
a point, or connected by telephones. (p. 18)
Concerning the exchange technology and price–formation mechanism there is also a very dif-
ferent, but explicit, presence of institutions for both authors. Walras’s has been stated in the sec-
ond section of this paper. In the case of Edgeworth it has been mentioned that the recontracting
process supposes a decentralized price pair–wise framework. The implicit exchange–rates of the
recontracting process are fixed by a bilateral bargaining game. This is not a cooperative game as
the strategies of all parties are (i) interdependent, and (ii) the context within which the decisions to
accept or not a definitive exchange is explicitly modeled. In fact, the most interesting characteristic
of Edgeworth’s theory of perfect competition is that it is developed as a limit case of an imperfect
competition framework. The notion of indeterminateness and the recurrent criticism addressed
by Edgeworth to Cournot show how important the analysis of monopolies and all other forms of
imperfect competition is for him. In fact, most of Mathematical Psychics is devoted to the anal-
ysis of “imperfect competition” and the policies that a scientific analysis can justify to solve the
potential problems of imperfect competition.14 Briefly, following Vind (1995):
Edgeworth’s definition of competition and exchange equilibrium did not share the norms and
goals of the later general equilibrium theorists. His notion of competition only makes sense in
a society with institutions, and would not have regarded the core as an interesting solution
concept even if it was instituion free. (Vind 1995, p.1740)
4 Concluding remarks: Imperfect Competition ... on which no-
tion of perfection do we stand?
It is obvious, and even uninteresting, to say that imperfect competition is a concept built upon a
conception of what is a perfect competitive situation. However, this simple reasoning is not always
adopted in economics. In fact, imperfect competition has rarely been constructed in relation to a
14 See pages 34 to 56 of Edgeworth (2003 [1881]).
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clear–cut concept of perfect competition. It is usual to find a mere rhetorical argument explaining
why the model violates the so–called Walrasian–competitive assumptiond by giving agents the
power to establish prices. Once the price–taker hypothesis is left aside, Pandora’s box is opened
for theoreticians. It is the box of the institutional framework where the exchanges take place.
However, the walrasian allocations are always kept as the benchmark. The way from the imperfect
situation to the so–called competitive situation is however not explicit. This is in fact one of the
reasons why the convergence between Edgeworth and Walras was a hopeful result for general
equilibrium theoreticians. It seems to demonstrate that the central point may be the number of
agents, without giving importance to other, more important, differences between those authors.
The cooperative–game approach has thus constructed an ideal framework in which it is pos-
sible to obtain the main results of the Arrow–Debreu model and, more importantly, to finally get
rid of the annoying auctioneer. However, all the properties and shortcomings of the centralized
Arrow–Debreu framework repapered within this new land of freedom. Even the wishes of the
founding–fathers of Game Theory where betrayed by cooperative–game theory:
Let us look more closely at the type of economy which is represented by the “Robinson Crusoe”
model, that is, an economy of an isolated single person or otherwise organized under a single
will... Thus Crusoe faces an ordinary maximum problem the difficulties of which are of a purely
technical... Consider now a participant in a social exchange economy. His problem has, of
course, many elements in common with a maximum problem. But also it contains some very
essential elements of an entirely different nature. He too tries to obtain an optimum result. But
in order to achieve this he must enter into relations with others... Thus each person tries to
maximize a function.., of which he does not control all variables. This certainly is no maximum
problem but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting maximum problems.
(von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, p.10)
This is exactly what the Core as a solution problem does not tackle. The centralized framework
of Walras’s theory translated into a game–theoretic approach produced a non–strategic behavior.
At least for the sole case that interested the Debreu–Scarf limit theorem which is the perfect com-
petitive allocation. There is a complete lack of a notion of competitiveness as common sense and
economic rhetoric conceive it. Let’s give the last word to an expert on the Core theory in order to
express this point clearer:
... the present game theoretical treatment of General Equilibrium is also guilty of this lack of
competitiveness. While the process leading to the establishment of the core is indeed a process of
rivalry, the eventual solution is purely cooperative and can be approximated by a set of compet-
itive prices. This is no surprise, in the sense that if we give two correct theories the same set of
assumptions, they will arrive at the same conclusions. (Schotter 1973, p.307)
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